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COMMENTS
the courts in the past, and that it does not seem probable that the time will
come when "aesthetics" standing alone will be accepted by the courts as an
effective doctrine. 74
Martin Rotb
74 The writer confesses his disappointment in his inability to investigate the intriguing
question of why the courts will only uphold "aesthetics" through the exercise of the
police power as opposed to developing some objective standard which will allow "aes-
thetics" to stand on its own, and thereby directly please the community pressure groups
without creating any legal fictions.
THE RAILWAY WORK RULES DISPUTE-A PRECEDENT
FOR COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
Collective bargaining is the process in the jurisprudence of the Ameri-
can workplace by which industrialist and worker have created bodies of
private law vital to our free enterprise system.' Compulsory arbitration
has been recognized as the antithesis of free collective bargaining,2 and has
been the object of almost universal condemnation.3 Against this general
background and the specific fact that "the railroad industry has been a
pioneer in the development of American collective bargaining ' 4 we can
deduce that only the most extraordinary chain of events could have led
Congress, on August 28, 1963, to the extraordinary enactment of Public
1 Collective bargaining is applauded by divergent interest groups. E.g., comments
of President Kennedy, White House Statement, June 15, 1963, Office of the White
House Press Secretary, reprinted in Hearings before the Senate Committee on Com-
merce on S.J. Res. 102, together with Report Nc. 459, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 24,
App. A-3, at 21 (1963) (hereinafter referred to a3 Hearings); President Eisenhower,
Address in San Francisco, August 26, 1956, in COLE, THE FUTURE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (Steiber ed. 1958); remarks of George Meany, President of
AFL-CIO, Hearings 608; remarks of Senator Goldwater, 109 CONG. REc. 15970 (1963);
and the findings of an independent study group for the Committee for Economic
Development in The Public Interest in National Labor Policy (1961).
2 Cf. Wolff Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas, 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
3 The Congress of American Industry and the National Association of Manufac-
turers, for example, in the platform of their joint 1937 convention, stated that "com-
pulsory governmental arbitration . . . is contrary to American principles." NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, COMPULSORY ARBI[TRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES (1938);
also, FRANCE, THE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION FALLACY, Pub. 31 (1959) (a pamphlet
published by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions, Industrial Union Department); Teller, A Labor Policy for America, pp. 254-
262, 1945).
4 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL RAILROAD COMMISSION 4 (established by Exec. Order
10891, Rifkind, Chairman, 1963), hereinafter referred to as RAILROAD COMMISSION, cita-
tions to unbound edition.
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Law 88-108. 5 This Statute, requiring the compulsory arbitration of the key
issues of the railway work rules dispute, is the outgrowth of a duel which
caught the American people in its crossfire. Railroad management and rail-
road labor have forced an indelible precedent on the statute books. It will
be regrettable, indeed, if this precedent becomes a snake-oil remedy liber-
ally taken for any and all labor-management headaches. Because enact-
ments of compulsory arbitration laws could surely "infect ... the whole
institution of collective bargaining,"6 we should approach such a prece-
dent with extreme caution. Perhaps a brief review of the law involved and
a record of the events that led up to and resulted from the passage of Pub-
lic Law 88-108 will provide us with a valuable yardstick for the future.
At the outset, compulsory arbitration must be distinguished from vol-
untary arbitration of labor disputes. Compulsory arbitration is first, the
prohibition of strikes and lockouts, and then, the establishment of a panel
of impartial arbitrators, vested with authority to decide disputes arising
between labor and management. 7 The decision of the panel is binding,
subject only to judicial review. 8 Voluntary arbitration is also the submis-
sion of a controversy to an impartial panel for binding decision. Here,
however, the submission is not initiated by government, but is agreed to
by both of the parties to the employment contract. Though voluntary
arbitration may be agreed to ad hoc, as disputes arise, it is usually written
into the terms of the collectively bargained contract that grievances aris-
ing out of the interpretation of that existing contract shall be submitted to
voluntary arbitration.9 Such arbitrations are quite common, 10 but it is rare,
indeed, that the parties will agree to delegate the power to create a new
contract to an arbitration board. 1
5 Act of Aug. 28, 1963, 77 Stat. 132, 45 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. V 1963).
6 Testimony of Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, Hearings 44.
7 Accord, Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924).
8 Provision for judicial review of arbitration rulings has been a means of preserving
the constitutionality of these laws from claims of denial of due process. Ferro v. Rail-
way Express Agency, 296 F.2d. 847 (C.A. 2, 1961); Parker v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co.,
108 F.Supp. 186 (N.D. 111. 1952); Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F.2d 235
(C.A. D.C. 1941). Recognizing the expertise of the arbitrator and the intent of the
legislator, courts have been hesitant to reverse the rulings. Hargis v. Wabash R.R. Co.,
163 F.2d 608 (C.A. 7, 1947); Futhey v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 96 F.Supp. 864
(N.D. Ill. 1951); Accord, Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959);
Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 305
(1943) (dictum).
9 E.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960).
10 It has been estimated that ninety-five per cent of labor contracts in existence in
the United States provide for voluntary arbitration of disputes concerning the exist-
ing agreement. France, op. cit. supra note 3.
11 See, Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAuv. L. REv.
999, 1001 (1955). See generally, id. at 999-1024.
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Debate in the Capitol reveals the legislator's cognizance of the truth that
the institution of governmental super-boards is an encroachment into the
economic processes whereby free trade unions and free employers inter-
act.12 There are critics, however, who suggest that a permanent compul-
sory arbitration law for key industries wculd prevent costly work stop-
pages. Ignoring for a moment the accompanying theoretical debilitation
to collective bargaining and free enterpris e, the practice of compulsory
arbitration may be viewed pragmatically. It is soon discovered that it is not
at all a panacea for the healing of labor-management abrasions. In an econ-
omy as interdependent as our own, complications attend the very attempt
to define "vital services" or "key industrie,;.' 53 Even if it were possible to
define key industries, difficulties arise. While it is highly unlikely that an
arbitration board knowingly would be unfair, in its very efforts to seek
compromise and be judicious such boards may simply "split the differ-
ences" without coming to the best decision. 14 There is, of course, the fur-
ther issue of whether a panel existing outside an industry can fully
acquaint itself with the peculiarities of tradition and personality that often
weigh heavily in these conflicts. The propriety of equitable enforcement
of awards resulting from compulsory arbitration has been questioned.' 5
Other nations have sought industrial peace by employing compulsory ar-
bitration laws'6 and have found only extensive regulation of private in-
dustry.' 7 In Senate debate, Senator Wayne Morse quoted Will Davis,
former Chairman of the National War Labor Board and later Director of
Economic Stabilization, as saying that "The determination of a contro-
versy between free citizens by the edict of Government is not a peaceful
12 109 CONG. REc. 15953 (1963) (remarks of Serator Pastore); 109 CONG. REc. 15896
(1963) (remarks of Senator Magnuson); 109 CoNe,. REc. 15970 (1963) (remarks of
Senator Goldwater); 109 CoNG. REc. 15910, 15976 (1963) (remarks of Senator Morse);
109 CONG. REc. 16123 (1963) (remarks of Congressman Fulton of Pennsylvania); 109
CONG. REC. 16121 (1963) (remarks of Congressman Brown of Ohio).
13 COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, COLLEcTIVE BARGAINING: How To MAKE
IT MORE EFFECTIVE (1947).
1 4 FRANCE, op. cit. supra note 3.
15 See Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 549 (1937); Red Cross
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Company, 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
16 Both Australia and New Zealand have long histories of compulsory arbitration,
New Zealand's statute being created in 1894, and Australia's beginning in New South
Wales in 1906. Witte, Experience with Strike Legislation Abroad, in COMPULSORY
FEDERAL ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES (Johnson ed. 1947); also in 248 Annals 138
(1946). It is reported, however, that in both New Zealand and Australia, strikes have
been as frequent as in Canada and Great Britain where collective bargaining has pre-
vailed. See FRANcE, op. cit. supra note 3.
17 COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ColLECTIvE BARGAINING: How To MAKE
IT MORE EE- Ivr (1947).
0 Io DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
thing, and it is not a settlement. It is an enforced termination of warfare,
and it settles nothing."' 8
Important pieces of legislation provide machinery for the encourage-
ment of the collective bargaining process,' 9 for Congress certainly recog-
nizes the deleterious effects of a strike-plagued economy. The extensive
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce most certainly includes
the authority to facilitate the amicable settlement of labor disputes which
threaten its free flow, 20 and Congress's authority to enter into the solution
of labor-management discords on the nation's railroads has been affirmed
by the Supreme Court.21 But, because of our basic free enterprise philoso-
phy, and Government's timidity in dictating terms to labor and manage-
ment, compulsory arbitration in this country has been minimal. 22
To be meaningful, any analysis of the railroad work rules dispute must
include the unique history of the industry.23 The growth of railroading,
from 40 miles of line in 1830 to 32,000 miles in 1861,24 parallels the growth
18 109 CONG. REC. 15977-78 (1963) (remarks of Senator Morse).
19 E.g., Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 141 (1958).
20 Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281
U.S. 548 (1930); Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
21 Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917). This case arose when President Wilson was
faced with an impending rail strike. Congress averted the crisis by enacting a law,
ch. 436, 39 Stat. 721 (1916), which set the eight-hour workday that was the main issue
of the controversy.
22 The Railway Labor Act, for example, provides for compulsory arbitration by the
National Railroad Adjustment Board on petition of a party to a dispute, 45 U.S.C.
153(i), (m) (1958). The Board, however, is empowered to hear only those minor
grievances arising under the interpretation of an existing contract. Elgin, J. & E. Ry.
v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945); Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co., 373 U.S. 33 (1963); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago
River & Indiana R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, rehearing denied, 353 U.S. 948 (1957). During
World War II, Congress instituted the National War Labor Board under the War
Labor Disputes Act, ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163 (1943) primarily to maintain harmony so that
wartime production would be uninterrupted. Though it performed its functions, the
experience proved that compulsory arbitration "has a narcotic effect on private bar-
gainers, that they turn to it as an easy-and habit forming-release from the obligation
of hard, responsible bargaining." Wirtz, The Challenge to Free Collective Bargaining,
in LABOR ARBITRATION AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE (Sixteenth Annual Meeting, National
Academy of Arbitrators, 1963). A member of the War Labor Board recalls that he
felt "an awareness of the dangers to collective bargaining . . . arising from govern-
ment control, and a desire to minimize those dangers and to 'get out of business' as
soon as possible." Feinsinger, Role of Government in Labor Disputes, in COMPULSORY
FEDERAL ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES (Johnson ed. 1947); also in 7 LAW. GUILD
REV. 19, 20 (1947).
23 So extensive is the writing on the development of the American railroad that John
Stover, in his book AMERICAN RAILROADS (1962), notes, in the bibliography, that in
recent years the Library of Congress has been acquiring new books on railroads and
railroad history at a rate of over two hundred titles per year.
24 RiCHAPDSON, Ti LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEER 1863-1963, at 91 (1963).
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of this nation. The workers in the railroad industry were among the first
laborers to organize in unions.25 Their organization followed strict craft
lines, 2 6 a fact which has complicated railroad employment relations to the
present day.27 Understanding the complexity of railroad labor relations
also requires a recognition of the geographdcally scattered facilities, con-
tinuous and irregular operations, complex inter-railroad services, safety
demands, multiplicity of skills and tasks required, and the extraordinary
duty to the public found in railroading. 28
Because of its unique significance, the rai]road industry "has historically
been given special and separate treatment by the Congress." 29 In its at-
tempts to prevent interruptions of commerce by keeping the trains oper-
ating, the Government took its first steps into legislation dealing with
disputes, gradually developing laws designed to ease relations and encour-
age bargaining.30 The product of these efforts is the Railway Labor Act
of 192631 which is the basic railway labor law today. 2
In addition to statutes, there evolved over a period of more than a cen-
tury, the complex, elaborate, and venerable "common law" which governs
the relations of railway management and labor. 3 This "common law" is
the product of long-established practices, habits, collective bargaining,
court decisions, federal and state legislation, and acts of the Director Gen-
25The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, organized in 1863; The Order of
Railway Conductors, 1868; The Brotherhood of Railroad Firemen and Enginemen,
1873; The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 1883. Stover, op. cit. supra note 23, at 119.
26 Shils, Industrial Unrest in the Nation's Rail Ivdustry, 15 LAB. L.J. 81 (1964).
27 There are five operating Brotherhoods, the "'Big Four" (listed in note 25 supra)
and The Switchmen's Union of North America. The "Big Four" are independent,
autonomous organizations unaffiliated with the AFL-CIO. There are also twenty-five
non-operating unions, that is, unions whose members do not actually control the
movement of the train. These unions are generally affiliated with the AFL-CIO and
traditionally represent the same kinds of workers in. other industries. Ibid.
28 RICHARDSON, op. cit. supra note 24, at 15-17.
29 Hearings; U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 837 (1963).
30 Federal labor legislation had its start with the Arbitration Act of 1888, ch. 1063,
25 Stat. 501 (1888), which provided for non-compulsory arbitration and investigation.
This act was used in the famous Pullman Strike of 1894. The Erdman Act, ch. 370, 30
Stat. 424 (1898), prohibited "yellow dog" contracts and initiated Government mediation
and conciliation, and the Newlands Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103 (1913), established a
permanent mediation and conciliation board. See, COHEN, LABOR LAW 139 (1964);
RICHARDSON, op. cit. supra note 24 at 281-82.
31 45 U.S.C. 151-88 (1958).
82 The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151-68 (1958), was influenced by the
Railway Labor Act. Railroading (and aviation) have never been brought under its
jurisdiction, but are governed by the Railway Labor Act.
83 Rics-AIasoN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 15-17.
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eral of Railroads during World War I, and governs, among other things,
the manning of trains, the assignment of tasks to employees, and the intri-
cate formulas under which they are paid.84 These labyrinthine principles
and patterns of behavior so imbedded in the industry are collectively
called "work rules."
During the early days of the industry, the work rules concerning fire-
men were first established. The task of the early fireman was to select and
load fuel into the wood-burning locomotive.8 5 Work rules continued in
force with the coal-burning locomotive which also required manual
labor.86
In the late 1920's the diesel locomotive began to appear on American
railroads.,7 Beginning in 1933, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Enginemen negotiated with individual carriers for the continued em-
ployment of firemen-helpers. The Brotherhood and substantially all of the
railroads negotiated the National Diesel Agreement of 1937 providing for
the employment of firemen-helpers on practically all diesel-powered
trains.3 When that agreement was signed, an industry representative esti-
mated that its provisions would increase annual payroll costs by approxi-
mately $445,000, and the Brotherhood judged that it would mean the
employment of some seven hundred additional firemen-helpers on loco-
motives then being operated by one man.89 Whatever the carriers' dis-
satisfaction, the terms of this agreement were preserved in later contracts,
the last dated May 17, 1950.40 While the work rules regarding the man-
ning of firemen on diesels firmly established themselves, the railroad
industry, from 1937 to 1962, had become almost one hundred per cent
"dieselized. ''41 Not seven hundred, but in excess of thirty thousand firemen
were employed on the diesel by 1962.
84 RAILROAD COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 3.
85 So difficult was the maintenance of sufficient steam pressure that it was not uncom-
mon in those infant days "to see the train stopped while the passengers and crew
gathered brush and wood from around the countryside.... ." RICHARDSON, op. Cit. supra
note 24, at 93.
86 Mr. J. E. Wolfe, Chairman of the National Railway Labor Conference, described
the task of the fireman on the coal locomotive, saying, "it was truly a job to fire a large
locomotive with a big firebox . . . and you did it with the working end of a scoop
shovel." Hearings 365.
87 Horowitz, The Diesel-Firemen Issue-A Comparison of Treatment, 14 LAB. L.J.
694 (1963).
38 Testimony of Mr. H. E. Gilbert, President of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen, Hearings at 482.
89 Horowitz, supra note 37.
40 Testimony of Mr. H. E. Gilbert, President of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen, Hearings at 482.
41 Between 1937 and 1961, the steam locomotive declined in number from 43,624 to
100, in contrast to the rise of the diesel from 218 to 28,150. By 1956, "88 per cent of
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The first hint of an attempted work rules change came in 1956 when the
carriers proposed that the terms of the National Diesel Agreement be
amended so that management could determine the employment of firemen.
The carriers withdrew this proposal as part of the negotiations of a con-
tract which included a moratorium of three years on work rules changes.42
The operating Brotherhoods, particularly the Brotherhood of Railroad
Firemen and Enginemen, could breathe freely for another three years, but
the threat to the long-established ways in a long-established craft was clear
to those who would face it.4 3
The firemen work rules problem may be treated as one unique factual
situation arising out of a singular industry if one ignores the larger prob-
lem which faced the firemen and which will face men in so many other
endeavors. The new technology, automation, is "a public blessing, ' 44 but
it will force the shocking truth of human obsolescence onto certain em-
ployees. In a manner typical of our traditions, those adversely affected
will look to law to salve their wounds. The only legislative precedent is
the 1963 compulsory arbitration statute; so this statute, born out of des-
peration, has the potentiality of setting a p*attern wherever automation
threatens the laborer. Certainly, solutions to problems incident to techno-
logical change should be reached through the collective bargaining proc-
ess, 45 but, whatever the approach, there is no hint that a single job should
be maintained that is no longer required,46 nor is there any implication that
technology should be arrested to protect employment.47
Automation has been particularly dynamic in the railroad industry
where the rise of such competing forms of transport as the automobile and
truck, airplane, and pipeline have acted as catalysts. The extensive incor-
portation of the diesel which achieves higher speeds, carries heavier loads,
operates with greater flexibility, and requires less maintenance, obviously
affects rail employees other than firemen. However, the diesel has been
the freight, 91 per cent of the passenger and 93 per cent of the yard service had been
dieselized." Horowitz, supra note 37, at 695.
421d.
43 In Canada, The Kellock Commission was studying the need for firemen on diesels
in freight and yard service. In December, 1957, it published its report recommending
dismissal. Horowitz supra note 37.
4 4
RAILROAD COMMISSION at 134.
45Id. at 12.
46 Testimony of Secretary of Labor W. Willard Virtz, Hearings at 45.
47President Kennedy said, "[W]cannot stop progress in technology or arrest
economic change in transportation or any other industry-nor would we want to." 109
CONG. REc. 13004, 13007 (House of Representatives); 109 CoNG. REc. 13095, 13098(Senate) (message to Congress, President Kennedy).
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only one of many automated developments in this industry,48 which had
undergone an industrial revolution while the employee was left undis-
turbed, lulled in the false security of the old work rules which he believed
to be immutable.
By 1959, the carriers were firmly dedicated to the principle that the
work rules would be revised to adhere to the new work patterns. Major
and secondary issues were taking shape.49 The primary issue was the em-
ployment of firemen. The work rules generally required that there be two
men (an engineer and a fireman) in the cab of all passenger, freight, and
yard diesel locomotives. The carriers sought the right to remove firemen
in all but passenger service. The Brotherhoods, on the other hand, con-
tended that the presence of firemen was essential for safe and efficient
operation, for the relief of engineers, and for the training of future engi-
neers.50 The other major issue, "crew consist," concerned the manning of
road and yard train service crews. While the carriers sought the unre-
stricted right to determine appropriate "crew consist," the Brotherhoods
wanted a national rule establishing minimum crew requirements. 51
By letter dated February 10, 1959, Daniel Loomis, President of the
Association of American Railroads, invited the organizations to join with
the carriers in seeking a presidential commission to draw up "sound new
work standards for the railroad industry .... -52When the organizations
rejected this proposal, the railroads unilaterally requested President Eisen-
hower to institute such an investigative board. In correspondence, Presi-
dent Eisenhower rejected this request, stating: "The appointment of a
Commission at this time could interfere with normal collective bargaining
48 Cohen, New Tecbnologies and Cbanging Manpower Requirements in Canadian
Railroads, 14 LAB. L.J. 685 (1963). Just a few of the major improvements are centralized
traffic control, mechanization of ways and structures work, electronic data processing,
the humpyard, integrated merchandise services including "piggy-back," and con-
tainerization. Cohen, supra; see generally, SHILS, AUTOMATION AND INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS 140, 256-57, 316 (1963).
49 The secondary issues arose out of the following situations in which the carriers
sought to exercise unrestricted discretion: the manning of motor cars and self-propelled
vehicles used in maintenance, repair, construction, and inspection; the establishment
of interdivisional runs, those runs which extend over territories where seniority rights
may conflict; assignment of road and yard work. Other issues concerned both the
railroads' and unions' efforts to modernize the methods of compensation. The unions
proposed employment security plans for members displaced by automation, merger,
and consolidation, and requested apprentice programs for certain classes of workers.
Report to the President in Railroad Rules Dispute, requested by President Kennedy
July 10, 1963, of his Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy, Chairman
W. Willard Wirtz, Vice-Chairman, Luther H. Hodges. Hearings at 15; U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1544 (1963).
50 Id. 61 Id.
52 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S.
284, 285 (1963).
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processes, and such a result would, in my judgment, not be in the public
interest. Accordingly, without expressing any opinion on the merits of
your proposal, I cannot consider it at this time. '53
The carriers, being left to the standard procedures, served notices (pur-
suant to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act 54) which enumerated
their intended changes in the work rules. The notices, served November
2, 1959,55 initiated correspondence and meetings between the parties. The
carriers' determination and the Brotherhoods' stubborn desire to maintain
the status quo rendered these meetings unp::oductive. There could be no
meaningful collective bargaining.5"
The sparring continued5 7 and management and labor finally agreed to
request the creation of a presidential commission to investigate and make
recommendations.5 The Presidential Railrotd Commission was appointed
and embarked on the most extensive review of the railroads ever made.59
By February 28, 1962, the Commission was able to submit a thorough
report to the Chief Executive. The report concluded that bargaining had
failed to dispel the anachronism of traditional work rules attached to mod-
ern technology. Certain basic considerations governed the thinking of the
Commission, namely, that the country is entitled to safe and efficient rail
transport; that management should be able to take advantage of the new
technology; that employees should receive fHtir compensation and work in
efficient and safe conditions; and that where automation adversely affects
employees, provision should be made for their welfare.60 On the major
issues, significant over-manning of firemen was found and it was suggested
53 This letter is reprinted in Hearings at 188.
54 45 U.S.C. 156 (1958).
55 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S.
284, 286 (1963).
56 109 CoNG. REC. 15905 (1963) (remarks of Senator Morse).
57 By September 7, 1960, the organizations sent naotices asking for negotiation on
wage structure, "crew consist," and employee protection plans, among other matters.
Hearings, Appendix B-2 at 28.
58 This agreement was executed October 17, 1960, tnder the auspices of the Secretary
of Labor. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372
U.S. 284, 286 (1963).
59 The committee, composed of five public members, five members represented labor
and five represented management, conducted hearings and compiled a record of more
than 15,000 pages of testimony and 20,000 pages of exhibits. Observation trips were
made, based on the itineraries laid out by both labor and management. Several Govern-
ment agencies, including the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Railroad Retirement Board,
and the Interstate Commerce Commission, contributed their efforts. RAILROAD COM-
MISSION at 29; Arnow, Labor on United States and Canadian Railroads-Findings of
the Presidential Railroad Commission, 14 LAB. L.J. 677 (1963).
60 RAILROAD COMMIssIoN, supra note 4, at 18.
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that the carriers cease hiring and terminate the employment of firemen
with less than ten years of service. A schedule of allowances was drawn
up, based on length of service, for those firemen who were to be dis-
missed. On the question of crew-consist, the Commission found that since
individual rail operations had individual problems separate reviews should
be made to discover over-manning.61 The report declared: "We do not
believe that the questions in dispute should be removed from the scope of
collective bargaining,"6 2 but, published with strong dissents by labor mem-
bers,63 it tended further to freeze the combatants into unyielding positions.
National conferences were resumed 64 until the then Secretary of Labor,
Arthur Goldberg, persuaded the parties to place the matter before the
National Mediation Board. 65 Being unable to unite the parties the Board
suggested that the matter be submitted to arbitration. The Brotherhoods
refused. 6
Once again the carriers served notices, dated July 26, 1962, stating that
the findings of the Commission would be effectuated on August 16, 1962.
The Brotherhoods filed suit claiming that there had been no collective
bargaining on the matters in the July notices and that they were thus pre-
mature. Management then withdrew these notices and replaced them with
the original, November 2, 1959, promulgations. Still the Brotherhoods
claimed that the collective bargaining required by the Railway Labor Act
had not occurred. 61 When the District Court found that the parties had
exhausted the Railway Labor Act procedures and could resort to self-
help, the Brotherhoods appealed. 68 The Court of Appeals affirmed, as it
found that the record of meetings and mediation fulfilled the broad de-
61 Id. at 109. 62 Id. at 12.
63 Commissioner Phillips opposed the report, stating that the fireman was a necessary
lookout, that he passes signals, maintains and restores locomotive power and is present
to relieve the engineer. Id. at 345.
64 Conferences ran from April 2, 1962 to May 17, 1962. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 284, 287 (1963).
65 Application was made to the National Mediation Board on May 21, 1962, pursuant
to 45 U.S.C. § 155 (First) (1958).
60 From May 25 to June 22, 1962, the Board conducted more than thirty meetings.
Having failed in its efforts it terminated its services on July 16, 1962. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 284, 287-288 (1963).
6745 U.S.C. 152 (1958); Virginian Ry. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515 (1937);
California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
68 The Brotherhoods succeeded in enjoining the carriers from effectuating the pro-
mulgations during the pendency and appeal of the suit as the carriers failed in their
contention that the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. 101 (1958), applied to manage-
ment as well as labor in prohibiting the granting of injunctive relief. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 310 F.2d 513 (C.A. 7, 1962);
Accord, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 229 F.2d 901 (C.A. 5,
1956).
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scription of collective bargaining and that management was free to carry
out the work rules revisions set forth in their promulgations.6 9 The organi-
zations filed a petition for a Writ of Certiorari claiming, inter alia, that the
Court of Appeals had failed to recognize that by its decision it was "plac-
ing it in the employer's discretion whether to permit union participation
at all. .. ."0 The Supreme Court cited Elgin 1. & E. Ry. v. Burley71 in
support of the proposition that the compuls:ion of the Railway Labor Act
is only to insure that the procedures set forth in it are exhausted before
the parties resort to self-help. Finding no bad faith on either side, the
Court merely concluded that the parties had done all they were required
by the law to do and that the parties wer. free to resort to self-help.7 2
The menace of a nationwide strike hung heavily in the air.
In order to forestall a strike, President Kennedy established an Emer-
gency Board73 pursuant to the Railway Labor Act.74 After the Board
dissolved without progress, the President appealed to the parties to main-
tain the status quo for the short period until July 10, 1963.75 On July 9,
President Kennedy again tried to persuade the Brotherhoods to submit the
matter to arbitration voluntarily. As an arbitrator, he selected the Asso-
ciate Justice of the Supreme Court, Arthur Goldberg, assuring the parties
that the Justice would disqualify himself from any decisions arising out
of the dispute.76 The Brotherhoods refused to submit the matter to Justice
Goldberg.7 7
69 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 310 F.2d.
503 (C.A. 7, 1962).
70 Brotherhoods' Petition for a Writ of Certiorar-i in the above case, note 69, at 32.
71 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
72 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 284
(1963).
73 The board was established on April 3, 1963. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 835 (1963).
7445 U.S.C. 160 (1958).
75 White House statement, June 15, 1963, Office of the White House Press Secretary,
reprinted in Hearings, App. A-3, at 21.
76 President Kennedy said: "Although the use of a member of the High Court for
additional duties has been and should be reserved for extraordinary situations-such as
the Nuremberg trials and the Pearl Harbor inquiry-I believe this situation is extraor-
dinary in terms of its impact on collective bargaining, its relationship to the whole
problem of technological unemployment and the potential effects of a nationwide rail
strike on our economy, our defense effort, and o'ar citizenry." White House state-
ment, July 9, 1963, Office of the White House Press Secretary, reprinted in Hearings,
App. A-2, at 20-21.
77 Senator Morse considered this refusal to be a most serious mistake. In debate on
the Senate floor he admonished the organizations, saying, "You parked your brains
outside the White House the day you walked in and refused to accept the President's
proposal to have Mr. Justice Goldberg arbitrate the ease." 109 CONG. REc. 15906 (1963).
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On July 22, 1963, the President addressed Congress."' He warned that
a rail stoppage would rapidly affect all aspects of the economy and do
serious harm to the national defense.79 The President recommended that
Congress legislate to transmit the matter to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission for an arbitration decision of a two-year tenure.80
The Commerce Committee began its hearings on July 23, and meeting
in evenings and on Saturday received 740 pages of testimony. 81 State-
ments were made by Secretary Wirtz, George Meany, and many others
influential in labor-management affairs. Still, efforts persisted to achieve
a settlement by collective bargaining. But the Commerce Committee was
forced to move rapidly because at 12:01 A.M. on August 29, if Congress
had not acted, the work stoppage would begin.
With Congress "up against the gun in an hour of crisis,"'82 and with no
acceptable alternative,83 it was forced to enact the compulsory arbitration
law. It was written to apply only to the present crisis 84 and established a
special arbitration board 85 which was to make binding decision on the two
key issues,86 the decision to govern for two years. 81 On August 29, 1963,
78 Text of President Kennedy's message. 109 CONG. REc. 13004 (House of Representa-
tives); 109 CoNG. REc. 13095 (Senate); U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 1537 (1963).
79 The Department of Defense, for example, moved 7.2 million tons of freight by
rail in the United States in 1963, on government bills of lading. This figure would be
multiplied if it included the tonnage moved on commercial bills of lading for con-
tractors of the Department. It is estimated that the total rail passenger traffic of the
Department during fiscal 1963, in the United States, amounted to 388 million passenger
miles. Letter of August 9, 1963, from J. McNaughton, General Counsel, Department
of Defense, to the Senate Commerce Committee, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. at 842 (1963).
80 Text of President Kennedy's message, supra note 78.
81 Hearings.
82 109 CONG. REc. 15890 (1963) (remarks of Senator Magnuson).
83The alternative of seizure of the railroads was recommended, 109 CONG. REc.
15898 (1963) (remarks of Senator Javits), as this was not without precedent. See War
Labor Disputes Act, ch. 144, Sec. 3, 57 Stat. 163 (1943). The amendment to this end
failed to pass (Yeas 3, Nays 88, Not Voting 9). 109 CONG. REc. 15966 (1963). See also
Siegel & Lawton, Stalemate in "Major" Disputes under the Railway Labor Act-The
President and Congress, 32 Go. WASH. L. REV. 8 (1963).
84 Act of Aug. 28, 1963, 77 Stat. 132, 45 U.S.C. § 157, Sec. 1 (Supp. V 1963).
85 Act of Aug. 28, 1963, 77 Stat. 132, 45 U.S.C. § 157, Sec. 2 (Supp. V 1963). The repre-
sentatives of labor spoke vigorously against submitting the dispute to the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Testimony of A. F. Zimmerman, Assistant Grand Chief En-
gineer, and Max Malin, Economic Counsel, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
Hearings at 430, 450-51.
86 Act of Aug. 28, 1963, 77 Stat. 132, 133, 45 U.S.C. § 157, Sec. 3 (Supp. V 1963).
87 Act of Aug. 28, 1963, 77 Stat. 132, 133, 45 U.S.C. § 157, Sec. 4 (Supp V 1963).
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President Kennedy signed the law and the immediate crisis was averted,
but the precedent of compulsory arbitration was imprinted in our laws.
Again there were hearings, witnesses, and exhibits, and on November 26,
1963, the Board ruled, among other things, that nearly two hundred rail-
roads could eliminate ninety per cent of the firemen's jobs in freight and
yard service and set forth a procedure for dismissal and attrition. Allow-
ances based on length of service were adopted from the Washington Job
Protection Agreement of 1936. The award was accompanied by a state-
ment of the carriers' representatives complaining of "unduly and unnec-
essarily burdensome" protective provisions for displaced workers. This
statement, however, fell far short of a dissent. On the other hand, the
Brotherhoods, through R. H. McDonald and H. E. Gilbert, dissented
strongly both on questions of fact and on the contention that the Board
had far exceeded its authority.88
Shortly after the special arbitration board's award, the organizations
sued to impeach it, arguing both that the award did not conform to the
requirements of the statute, and that the staturte itself was unconstitutional.
The District Court decision"9 unqualifiedly affirmed the arbitration board's
creation and award saying, "The statute is clearly constitutional as being
within the power of the Congress. . . .[Aind the board acted lawfully
within the orbit of the authority delegated to it."90 The United States Su-
preme Court denied the unions' petition for Certiorari. 91 Problems con-
tinue to this date to arise out of the award, not the least of which is the
matter of implementation in states that have conflicting "full crew" laws.92
Questions concerning the award's interpretation and its application to in-
dividual workers are not completely answered.98
Still outstanding were the questions conceraing the wage structure, paid
holidays, self-propelled machines, and the other matters that had come to
88 Award of Arbitration Board No. 282, November 26, 1963; 87 MONTHLY LABOR REV.
36 (Jan. 1964) and material supplementary thereto; see Shils, supra note 26.
89Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Eng.inemen v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co. 225 F.Supp. 11 (D. D.C. 1964).
90 Id. at 23.
91377 U.S. 918 (1964).
92 These measures have been criticized as uneconomical and unnecessary in operating
with modern equipment. They have, however, bee:ai upheld in the courts. Missouri
Pacific R.R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931), and are still prevalent. E.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-881 to § 40-885; CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 6901-906; IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 55-1326 to § 55-1338; N.Y. RAILROAD LAW§ 54-b. See generally, Work Rules Contro-
versy in Perspective, 87 MONTHLY LABOR REV., p. III (March 1964).
93 The Arbitration Board reconvened to consider and decide certain questions relat-
ing to the meaning or application of its award. Questions were submitted by the parties
and answers were published May 17, 1964. Still grievances of individual workers con-
tinue to plague the Board.
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be known as secondary issues. 94 Now the so-called secondary issues were
presenting another rail crisis. The Brotherhoods had always engaged in
industry-wide bargaining, but a change in strategy prompted them to con-
sult separately, in early March, 1964, with the Louisville and Nashville and
the Southern Pacific Roads. 95 The carriers stated that they would go ahead
with proposed changes on April 10, 1964, and a strike was called.96 The
White House quickly responded, but a team of mediators97 was making
little progress as the parties were as intractable as before. In fact, some ob-
servers felt that the parties were waiting for Congress to act on its prece-
dent and pass another compulsory arbitration law.98 President Johnson,
however, was unwilling to foster another such law. 9 Both the prestige
and pressure of the White House roused the parties to legitimate bargain-
ing and the completion of a memorandum of agreement. 100 On April 22,
1964, the President declared on nationwide television that collective bar-
gaining had succeeded. He said, "This agreement is American labor and
American business operating at its very best-at the highest levels of public
responsibility."'' Clashes have arisen as to certain terms of the memoran-
dum of agreement and on May 7, 1964, mediators Dr. George Taylor and
Theodore Kheel issued a clarification. But this collectively bargained
contract and those that have followed are the product of union and man-
agement sitting down together, and indicate, hopefully, that the parties are
at last prepared to face the grave responsibilities ahead.
Automation, the new technology, means greater productivity and in-
creased prosperity, and it is the natural creation of a dynamic economy.
But with automation, industry, shop, and factory will be faced with chal-
94 Secondary issues listed supra note 49.
95 Work Rules Controversy in Perspective, supra note 92. On April 8, 1964, a strike
against the Illinois Central brought a shutdown of operations on 6,500 miles of track.
Another Strike, Another Truce-Why the Rail Dispute Goes On, U.S. News and
World Report, April 20, 1964 p. 77.
906 Another Strike, Another Truce . . . , supra note 95.
97 The mediators included Secretary of Labor, V. Willard Wirtz, Assistant Labor
Secretary, James Reynolds, and Chairman of the National Mediation Board, Francis
O'Neill. The President added the services of George Taylor of the University of
Pennsylvania, and Theodore Kheel, another prominent arbitrator.
98 Johnson Swings a Red Lantern, Business Week, April 18, 1964, p. 25.
99 President oJhnson said, "I am not here to bury collective bargaining, I am here
to preserve it." Johnson Swings a Red Lantern, supra note 98.
100 It provided for pay raises for about 100,000 workers, seven paid holidays (the
union men had never had paid holidays), allowances for away-from-home expenses,
and manning of repair vehicles in addition to other articles. In combination with the
earlier arbitration award, the railroads estimated their savings at $300,000,000 a year.
N.Y. Times, April 23, 1964, p. 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, April 26, 1964, sec. 4, p. 2, col. 3.
101 N.Y. Times, April 23, 1964, supra note 100.
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lenges not far different from those which confronted the railroads. Does
this mean that the parties will shrug off their responsibilities and look to
Congress to act as it acted in the work rules crisis? In the thick of debate
on Public Law 88-108, a Congressman asked, "Where is this industry, this
free enterprise that has said, 'Let me hand]e management affairs without
Government interference . . .'? Where is this brave new world of free en-
terprise ... ?-"102 It is true that automation presents issues that go deeper
and hurt more. It is delusion to minimize the task of the union negotiator
who may one day go to his people and say "I negotiated so that 10,000 of
you will lose your jobs.' 0 3 But, is the burden of these complex problems
so heavy that the combatants will surrender them gratefully to Govern-
ment?
On August 28, 1963, the parties to the work rules dispute dealt an in-
calculable blow to free collective bargaining. To insure against their
lapsing back into this precedent, disputants must renew their dedication,
fully recognizing their duty to bargain collectively in good faith.104
Surely they have come a long way since Cyrus Eaton suggested as a
prelude to labor-management harmony that "We will have to begin by
•.. recognizing, and sincerely regretting, that there is bad feeling on both
sides. For every corporation officer who characterizes a union official as a
crook there is a labor leader willing to labe. an industrialist a bandit. Our
next step ought to be full and ungrudging acceptance of labor as human
beings and as our partners who do the work."'105 But, there is a long way
to go. Recalling the words spoken by the Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg
when he served as Secretary of Labor will lead to a redoubling of this ef-
fort. He said, "It is imperative to freedom that collective bargaining work
in America, that it remain the center of economic decision and the agency
to which employees, managers, and the public can look with full expecta-
tion of justice and fairness."' 0 6 The industrialist and the worker must re-
solve their own disputes, for the American people, for the enterprise
system, and as stewards of the free bargaining tradition.
Barbara Hirscb
102 109 CONG. REC. 16123 (1963) (remarks of Congressman Fulton of Pennsylvania).
103 109 CONG. REC. 15894 (1963) (remarks of Senator Magnuson).
104 H. J. Heinz Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 U.S. 514 (1941); National
Labor Relations Board v. Insurance Agents' International Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960);
Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1401 (1958).
105 Eaton, A Capitalist Looks at Labor, in COM'4PULSORY FEDERAL ARBITRATION OF
LABOR DISPUTES (Johnson ed. 1947); also in 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 332, 333 (1947).
106 Goldberg, Collective Bargaining and the Pubj'ic Interest, in COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING AND THE ARBITRATOR'S ROLE 229, 233 (Fifteenth Annual Meeting, National Academy
of Arbitrators, 1962).
